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AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL APPROACH TO
CLASS CERTIFICATION: A CLASSY
UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEMS
OF CLASS CERTIFICATION
Perhaps the most important aspect of class action litigation is
the class certification process The primary difficulty with class
certification is determining when a group of individuals constitutes
a class. Any time separate, individual claims are aggregated, the
possibility exists that any given litigant will lose autonomy and
control over the discrete merits of his case.2 As such, ascertaining
when certification is appropriate for a group of litigants can be as
formidable as it is complex.
Although the certification process presents many difficulties in
any context, it is particularly troublesome and fraught with contra-
dictory decisions in the mass tort area. Mass tort claimants, unlike
1. Other difficult aspects of class action litigation include selection of the representa-
tive and the appropriate counsel, the extent of court involvement in regulating litigation,
and the amount of the fees awarded. These factors combine to make class action litigation
difficult and costly for the litigants, the lawyers, and the courts. However, class action
lawsuits are useful because "[s]eparate litigation of numerous similar claims entails enor-
mous waste. Plaintiffs duplicate effort needlessly, consume a greater amount of scarce
judicial resources than is necessary for a just resolution of their claims, and often force
the defendant to juggle several suits in scattered forums." Note, Class Certification in
Mass Accident Cases Under Rule 23(b)(1), 96 HARV L. REV. 1143, 1144 (1983).
2. David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Col-
lective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 561-62 (1987). This loss of control in joint adjudication
also provides significant incentives for the litigants to eschew the class action in favor of
bringing their claims separately. For example, "[m]any plaintiffs mistakenly perceive that,
if the defendant's assets are limited or if multiple punitive damages may be barred, their
best interests lie in a race to a quick recovery." Class Certification, supra note 1, at
1147-48. In addition, litigants who have substantial claims are deterred from using the
class action. A litigant "whose claim is sufficiently large to justify litigation may incur
few litigation costs if a defendant offers a substantial settlement shortly after the accident.
And in class actions, plaintiffs with large claims will be constrained in negotiating settle-
ments and in allocating any recovery by the duty to represent the entire plaintiff class."
Id. at 1147. The resulting loss of focus on any one individual creates many competing
interests among the claimants, the defendants, and the courts. Consequently, courts must
carefully weigh and balance these interests when making a certification decision.
3. See In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 1990) (denying class
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many other types of class claimants, tend to be very loosely con-
nected with one another. This loose affiliation follows from the
generally individualized nature of the claims, which often arise in
completely different settings and at different times. Moreover, the
individuality exacerbates the tensions which result from aggregating
single claimants into a class. As a consequence, defining a class of
mass tort claimants provides an especially useful vehicle for study-
ing the nature of the certification process.
At present, the certification process is governed by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23.4 Determining when a group of indi-
certification on the basis that "the plaintiffs suffer from different diseases some of which
are more likely to have been caused by asbestos than others"); In re Federal Skywalk
Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1184 (8th Cir. 1982) (vacating certification even though the trial
judge "certified the class based solely on his judgment that such action would best serve
the interests of all parties involved"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982); In re Northern
Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield ID Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 850 (9th Cir. 1982)
(vacating certification because punitive damages to be awarded would differ among the
jurisdictions), cer. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983); Vincent v. Hughes Air W., Inc., 557
F.2d 759, 767-68 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that "a class action brought on behalf of the
next-of-kin of aircrash victims" is not certifiable); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United
States Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 523 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1975) (ruling
that class certification may not be based on actions similar only in regards to damages),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 109 F.R.D. 269, 281
(E.D. Tex. 1985) (granting certification for "insulation workers and household members
alleging injuries from exposure to insulation products containing asbestos"), aft'd, 782 F.2d
468 (5th Cir. 1986); In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 102 F.R.D. 239, 241-42 (S.D.
Ohio 1984) (granting certification for class of 700 people who were exposed to a drug in
utero causing stillbirth or birth defects), appeal disnissed sub. trin. Schreir v. Menell
Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 745 F.2d 58 (6th Cir. 1984); In re Asbestos School Litig., 104
F.R.D. 422, 433-34 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (granting certification even though the class would be
large, since the class action appeared to be a "superior" approach to "individual litiga-
tion"), affj'd, 921 F.2d 1310 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1623 (1991); In re
Three Mile Island Litig., 87 F.R.D. 433, 440-41 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (denying certification for
the class comprised of those plaintiffs claiming physical injuries "linked with emotional
distress" since each claim is "diverse and personal"); Marchesi v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,
68 F.R.D. 500, 501-02 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (denying certification since class actions are not
the favored manner of disposition for mass accident liability, especially in cases of aircraft
disasters); Causey v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 392, 399 (E.D. Va. 1975)
(denying certification due to the possibility of resulting complex conflicts of law ques-
tions, the inappropriateness of the resulting forum, and the better alternative of individual
litigation); Yandle v. PPG Indus., Inc., 65 F.R.D. 566, 570-71 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (denying
certification since the class would have included employees suing an employer for differ-
ent acts to different individuals over a ten year period); Hobbs v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,
50 F.R.D. 76, 80 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (denying certification since forum inappropriate and
individual litigation would be better suited to everyone's best interests).
4. Rule 23 provides for a class action when the following requirements are met:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
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viduals is similarly situated5 enough to constitute a class requires
not only the actual application of the provisions of Rule 23, but
also a keen understanding of which characteristics among the group
indicate a sufficient similarity to justify certification. More simply,
Rule 23 contains general requirements of commonality, but the rule
does not specify for courts which particular traits of the group or
attributes of the questions or issues presented they should focus on
during the certification process.
The Advisory Committee to Rule 23 acknowledged the dan-
gers associated with granting class certification to loosely affiliated
mass tort claimants in a note to Rule 23.6 The Committee warned
that mass torts are not appropriate for class action treatment due to
the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class
would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the
class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of
the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the
extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the lit-
igation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered
in the management of a class action.
5. For the purposes of this paper, -similarly situated" refers to individuals who are
related to one another by virtue of the nature of their claims and rights. The term has no
reference to other areas of law.
6. The drafters wrote:
A 'mass accident' resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not
appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant ques-
tions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses to liability, would be
present, affecting the individuals in different ways. In these circumstances an
action conducted nominally as a class action would degenerate in practice into
multiple lawsuits separately tried.
R. CIV. P. 23 Advisory Committee's Note.
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the perceived fact that the individuals are not related closely
enough to be defined as a class.7 To a large extent, the current
disparities found in the judicial decisions regarding certification are
the result of the disagreement about how to define a class for
certification.
The purpose of this note is to examine the class definition
process from a theoretical perspective. It begins by exploring the
two primary justifications used by courts to permit class action
litigation under the common law. These theories are known as the
"community of interest theory" and the "common right theory."8
Although these common law justifications for defining class litiga-
tion were thought to be eliminated with the emergence of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, this note argues that these justifica-
tions exist in the original Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 as
well as amended Rule 23. The manner in which original and
amended Rule 23 incorporate and rely on these justifications is
central to understanding the differences in how courts conduct
certification and whether certification will be granted to a particular
group.
The original Rule 23 directly incorporated the community of
interest and common right theories. The rule contained several
subdivisions, each of which authorized a different type of class
action.9 As a result, the type of class action sought under the orig-
inal rule determined the justificatory theory the court employed in
determining whether the group constituted a class. Consequently,
the original rule was grounded in both theories.
In contrast, amended Rule 23 attempts to describe, in very
practical terms, situations or contexts appropriate for class action
treatment. Each of the contexts is a different type of class. Howev-
er, by providing these practical situations, amended Rule 23, unlike
original Rule 23, lacks a clear theoretical basis for its existence
7. See, e.g., Yandle v. PPG Industries, Inc., 65 F.R.D. at 569 (noting that -[c]lass
actions have had limited application in the past in mass tort cases, particularly due to the
recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Rules").
8. The terms common right and community of interest are defined later in this note.
See infra text accompanying notes 23-28. A number of other commentators and varioui
courts also refer to these theories as the community of interest theory and the common
right theory. Unfortunately, each person has understood these terms differently, and so,
they may not translate precisely to other works and cases. Irrespective of the particular
label, the content of these theories will be similar.




and is, therefore, susceptible to construction according to either the
common right theory or the community of interest theory depend-
ing on the particular theory of class certification subscribed to by
the court.
After discussing the problems in class certification under Rule
23, this note discusses the epistemological foundation of the two
theories. In examining how the community of interest and common
right theories function, from an epistemological perspective, this
paper argues that the presently perceived disparities shrink in im-
portance. The result of such an analysis is a clearer, more coherent
understanding of how class certification is conducted by the courts.
In addition, this investigation will aid in determining what charac-
teristics of a group are relevant and what the proper relationship
among the group members ought to be before certification is ap-
propriate.
Structurally, this note is divided into six sections. The first
three sections explain the framework in which judicial decisions are
made. The final three sections examine various case law decisions
indicating the existence of the framework elucidated in the first
half. In particular, Section One discusses the nature of a class
action and its place in the common law.' ° Studying the role of a
class action clarifies the objective of the process of defining what
constitutes a class. This section describes the two basic judicial
theories that developed as well as the development of Rule 23.
Section Two closely analyzes how Rule 23 presently functions."
In Section Three, the theoretical difficulties created by the 1966
amendments to Rule 23 are explored.'2 Section Four analyzes ju-
dicial decisions regarding class certification of mass torts.' 3 In
particular, three provisions of Rule 23 are closely examined. Final-
ly, Sections Five and Six explore epistemological problems associ-
ated with the current method of class definition and propose a
uniform theoretical structure for defining a class. "4 The adoption
of this theoretical structure will allow for a far greater coherence in
the class certification process.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 11-42.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 43-46.
12. See infra text accompanying note 47.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 48-112.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 113-31,
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I. DEFINITION OF A CLASS
Procedurally, one of the first steps in any class action is the
class certification. Certification is the process by which the court
determines when a group of individuals may litigate as a class
instead of requiring them to bring individual actions. During this
process, the court essentially defines the class. By applying a set of
criteria to the group of individuals, the court imposes limits on
what characteristics must be present in the group. In Federal court,
these criteria are prescribed in Rule 23.
Rule 23's requirements, to a large extent, control the certifica-
tion process by describing the elements necessary for class certifi-
cation among a group of individuals. However, Rule 23 is broadly
drafted, allowing courts to use two different theoretical approaches
when applying and testing for the presence of the necessary ele-
ments. Simply, the objective wording of Rule 23 does not impose
any particular conceptual approach on courts' certification analysis.
This allows courts to determine the manner in which it will evalu-
ate the group for the elements required by the rule.'5 Thus, the
theoretical approach adopted by the court toward class definition
governs how the criteria of Rule 23 are applied. Consequently,
how class definition is understood is often determinative of whether
15. Professor Simeone acknowledges the need to determine the manner in which the
court evaluates the group of people seeking certification.
While the whole population may be said to be bound together by common
interest, the common interest involved in class litigations must of necessity be a
narrow and limited interest which will prove beneficial or adverse to the hold-
ers. While it is universally recognized that there must be community of interest
among the members of the class, nowhere is that phrase defined or clarified.
The statutory provision requires that the questions be one of common or gen-
eral interest' to the persons who are many or too numerous to be brought
before the court. These words, either standing alone or in context in the clause
have been most perplexing. Does this requirement mean that parties must be
'united in interest' before it proper to bring the action in a representative form?
Does the 'question' mean a question of fact or law? Does the code require that
there must be a 'common' interest in the subject matter of the litigation or a
'common interest' in the object of the suit, or in the relief to be obtained?
Must the interests of the various parties be joint or common or may they be
separate and distinct interests, each person having a separate right of action or
defense, but tied together by a common bond of fact or law? . . . The ques-
tions as such have never been considered by the courts, and the result has
been confusion in determining the boundaries and meaning of 'question' and
'common interest.'
Joseph J. Simeone, Jr., Class Suits Under the Codes, 1955 WEs. RES. L. REV. 5, 17
(1955).
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certification is granted or denied.
Prior to analyzing the court's approach to class definition, an
understanding needs to exist regarding why such a definition is
actually needed. This will provide a structure in which to study
how the court defines a group to be a class.
A. Common Law Adjudication and Class Actions
Before examining the theoretical aspects of the certification
process, the role of the class action within the common law system
of adjudication must be understood. One of the most basic precepts
of the common law is that of individual justice. 6 In fact, the in-
violability of person and property is perhaps the most fundamental
tenet of the common law." Within this notion of individual jus-
tice, a specific concept of adjudication exists. "Litigation is orga-
nized as a contest between two individuals or at least two unitary
interests, diametrically opposed, to be decided on a winner-takes-all
basis." t8 An example of the primacy of this concept is the amount
of time and attention the tort system lavishes on each and every
claim and the detail with which it tailors its remedy to the specific
facts, the defendant's conduct, and the plaintiff's injury. 9 This
notion of individuality permeates the law on a procedural as well
as substantive level.
Class actions must be able to function within this individualis-
tic litigation structure. Thus, some tension results in a class action
since, at bottom, a class action is the antithesis of individual litiga-
tion; it is a means of aggregating separate, individual claims. In
fact, its express purpose is to provide an efficient resolution of the
same question or questions among many parties.2" Resolving the
16. See Roscoe Pound, Do We Need a Philosophy of Justice, 5 CoLUM. L. REV. 339,
346 (1905) (stating that "the common law . . . is concerned, not with social righteous-
ness, but with individual rights").
17. Id. at 342.
18. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv.
1281, 1282 (1976).
19. Rosenberg, supra note 2.
20. Such a device is unique in the common law, since historically, parallel claims
brought by numerous plaintiffs usually could not be combined for adjudication.
ZECHAtIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 153 (1950).
Joseph Story argues that class action procedure is a direct descendant of English
equity practice and bills of peace. He defines a bill of peace as a bill brought "to estab-
lish and perpetuate a right which he [the claimant] claims, and which from its nature may
be controverted by different persons .... " 2 JOSEPH STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §
1173 (14th ed. 1918).
1303192]
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tension between a class -action and the individual nature of the
common law has led to the development of several theories which
justify aggregating groups of people and their claims. 2' These jus-
tifying theories, referred to as community of interest and common
right, recognize that there is no inherent right to litigate as a class
in the common law.22 To be certified as a class, the group must
be defined in a judicially recognized manner, i.e., the class must
contain the necessary characteristics demanded by either the com-
mon right or community of interest theories. Conversely, a court
conducting a certification analysis will look for the presence of
characteristics believed to be consistent with the particular theory
chosen to justify class certification. As a result, the theory the
court employs in the certification process defines the class, since
the group must exhibit those traits upon which the specific theory
focuses. In summary, the selection of the definitional approach
controls the entire certification process by serving as the very
explanation of why and how the group may be a class.
B. Theories of Interest
Both the common right and community of interest theories
recognize the individualist nature of common law adjudication. As
a result, both begin with the premise that the greater the
individuals' resemblance to each other, the less tension is generated
between the aggregating principles of the class action and the
individualist structure of the common law. Both theories attempt to
define a class by identifying qualities which make the group cohe-
sive. The common right and community of interest theories differ,
however, in the cohesive traits deemed relevant and where those
traits exist among the individuals.
The common right theory locates the binding interest or com-
21. See infra text accompanying notes 23-28 (discussing, in detail, the development of
the community of interest and common right theories).
22. Stephen Yeazell argues that the need to provide a justification for collective lit-
igation may be traced to Adair v. New River Co., 32 Eng. Rep. 1153, 1158-59 (Ch.
1805), in which the court specifically held that group litigation does not arise from social
circumstances, but from judicial discretion as a matter of convenience. STEPHEN C.
YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 184
(1987). He further proposes that this new understanding of collective litigation had two
profound impacts on the modem class action. First, it provided precedent for the idea that
whenever a group wants to sue, it must seek the court's determination of the appropri-
ateness of collective litigation. Id. at 186. Second, the class of litigants are characterized
as an interest class. Id.
1304 [Vol. 42:1297
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mon characteristics in the actual right being asserted; "all members
of the class must share 'one right' ... y23 By focusing on the
right, which all plaintiffs must exhibit, a court applying this theory
conceives of "[c]lass litigation [as] affect[ing] class interests, not
individual interests." 24 Each class members' possession of the very
same right permits the aggregation and provides the cohesive force
among the individuals. Thus, "[w]ith respect to [these] class in-
terests, class members were 'homogeneous'; all stood 'in the same
situation'." z This homogeneity allows the group to become a
class.26
The essence of the common right theory is a qualitative ap-
proach to defining the class. It concentrates on the type of right
asserted and not on a commonality among many traits. Each mem-
ber of the group must assert the same kind of right against one or
more defendants. It is the type or nature of the right of each indi-
vidual plaintiff that determines whether they will be certified.
When the group, manifests rights which are not qualitatively the
same, the common right theory requires that certification be denied
for lack of cohesion among the individuals.
In contrast, the community of interest theory does not require
the presence of a common right; it permits the individuals to have
23. Note, Developments in the Law -Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1331
(1976) (quoting C.C. Langdell, A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction (VII): Creditors'
Bills, 5 HARV L. REV. 101, 128 (1891)). An example of the common right theory was
Bromley v. Smith, 57 Eng. Rep. 482 (Ch. 1826), cited in Developments in the Law, supra
at 1333 n.15. The facts of Bromdey were as follows:
Nine parishioners of a borough brought an action on behalf of all other pa-
rishioners against borough officials who had allegedly allocated funds inconsis-
tently with their responsibilities under an Enclosure act. The defendants argued
that the asserted misappropriation had been ratified by a majority of the parish-
ioners, and thus that a suit challenging the appropriation could not be brought
on behalf of the parishioners. Prior to enclosure, the rights had been in com-
mon, and the Enclosure Act, although altering the contents of those rights,
evidently did not transform their nature. Sir John Leach, Vice Chancellor, held
that, given the common right, the class suit was proper.
Id. The unifying element which allowed the group to proceed as a class was that each
person was a tenant in common, and so, had the exact same right in the property as the
other tenants in common.
24. Developments in the Law, supra note 23, at 1334.
25. Id.
26. Early endorsement of this theory came in Smith v. Swormnstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.)
288, 302-03 (1854), where the Supreme Court held that a group of methodist ministers
representing a group of 1,500 people with rights to a fund managed by the church could
maintain a bill in equity on behalf of themselves and others and that the judgment in
such an action would bind the absentees. See YEAzELL, supra note 22, at 221-22 (dis-
cussing the Smith case).
130519921
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separate and distinct rights. Under the community of interest theo-
ry, a group of individuals having separate and distinct rights can
litigate as a class if they are united by a number of common
attributes.27 Here, the interest is found in the common questions
of law and fact resulting from a common subject matter.28 It is
the subject matter which engenders a sufficient commonality among
the group to make it cohesive enough to litigate as a class.
In contrast to the qualitative focus on the rights in the com-
mon right theory, community of interest has a more quantitative
bias. Each member of the group cannot claim the exact right
against the defendant, but the individuals must share a common
nucleus of facts from which their rights are derived. The cohesion
among the individuals is achieved through the existence of com-
mon questions of law or fact. The more common questions the
group manifests, the more related and cohesive the group. Con-
versely, the fewer common questions, the more likely the presence
of varying subject matters-and the greater the likelihood individuals
are asserting separate and discrete claims.
The qualitative and quantitative differences of the analyses of
common right and community of interest are vital determinants in
defining a class. The different manner in which the two theories
justify and define a group as a class directly affects whether a
court will grant or deny certification. As a consequence, the theo-
ries provide a foundation upon which Rule 23 functions.
27. 1 JOHN N. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AND EQuITABLE REMEDIES, § 255 at
432-33 (3d ed. 1905). Burke v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 109 N.E.2d 358 (Ill. App.
1952), illustrate the community of interest theory.
The Illinois Commerce Commission issued an order requiring the telephone
companies to revise, print and distribute directories at least semi-annually. The
Illinois Bell Company neglected to revise its directories for subscribers of tele-
phones in Chicago and the suburban area. The plaintiff brought action on be-
half of himself and all other subscribers who were similarly affected for dam-
ages which the court called a 'request for refund' under the provisions of the
Public Utilities Act. Here is a situation in which hundreds of person have
claims against the telephone company which is by law required to perform a
particular act and has failed to do so. Each of the subscribers has a claim for
reparation which could be determined in one action by means of the class
device.
Simeone, supra note 15, at 29.
28. Roger H. Transgrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L.
REV. 779, 818 (1985) (noting that although the community of interest premise made class
actions theoretically available for mass torts, there was no instance of a mass tort class
action in 17th and 18th century England).
1306 [V/ol. 42:1297
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C. Determination of Appropriateness of Class Treatment
The common right and the community of interest theories
were incorporated directly into the original Rule 23 by its creation
of different types of class actions referred to as "true,"29 "hy-
brid,"3" and "spurious."31 The amended Rule 23 rejected this ap-
proach to defining classes and adopted an alternative approach
much less complicated and less prone to error. However, amended
Rule 23 did not eliminate the presence of the common right and
community of interest theories as foundations for defining the
class. Consequently, the courts are now free to follow either theory
for defining a class, a situation which has led to uncertain applica-
tion of the rule in practice.32
1. Original Rule 23
Under the original rule, the court was required to focus on the
character of the jural relationships among the group members in
order to define a class. Jural relationships are formed among the
individuals of a group as a result of their asserting certain rights.
The interests that bind the group create the jural relationships.
Original Rule 23 defined a class by the nature of the jural relation-
ships. 3
3
29. Of the true class action, Professor Moore writes it "is one wherein, but for the
class action device, the joinder of all interested persons would be essential. This would be
in cases where the right sought to be enforced was joint, common, or derivative .... ." 2
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 2235 (1938), as quoted in John Keefe et al., Lee Defeats
Ben Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 327, 330 (1948).
30. A hybrid class action is appropriate where,
"[though the class has a mutuality of interests in the question involved, still
the rights of the members of the class are neither joint nor common; they are
several. In addition to the question of fact common to all, there is, in lieu of
joint or common interests, the presence of property which calls for distribution
or management. This type of action is exemplified by a creditor's bill for the
appointment of a receiver .
Ia (quoting 2 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE at 2239).
31. Professor Moore defines the spurious class suit in the following manner.
"This is a permissive joinder device. The presence of numerous persons inter-
ested in a common question of law or fact warrants its use by persons desiring
to clean up a litigious situation. Assume that a railroad negligently sets fire to
property, and widespread damage to many property owners ensues. Here is a
questions of law or fact common to many persons .
Id (quoting 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE at 2241).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 57-112.
33. JAMEs W. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 23.30 (2d ed. 1984).
13071992]
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There were three kinds of jural relationships: joint, common,
and several. 4 From a determination of the kind of jural relation-
ship existing among the group members, the court then determined
the type of class existed. The type of class indicated the degree to
which the judgment was binding on the class."
A true class is premised on the common right theory, and a
hybrid class is founded on a community of interest theory, but
only as applied to a single piece of property. By requiring the
presence of a common property, the courts were able to ensure the
rights of each member were nearly exactly the same.36 Thus, the
original Rule 23 essentially was a derivation of the common right
theory.37 Consequently, original Rule 23 required the court to
analyze carefully the quality or type of rights being asserted and,
moreover, it limited the binding effect of the class depending on
which theory defined the class.38
2. Amended Rule 23
The qualitative analysis of the jural relationships proved diffi-
cult for courts to apply. The Advisory Committee, which drafted
the amendments, wrote that "[i]n practice the terms, 'joint,' 'com-
mon,' etc., which were used as the basis of the Rule 23 classifica-
tion proved obscure and uncertain .... The courts had consider-
able difficulty with these terms."39 The amendments to the rule
34. Id.
The categories of class actions in the original rule were defined in terms of the
abstract nature of the rights involved . . . . It was thought that the definitions
accurately described the situations amenable to the class suit device, and also
would indicate the proper extent of the judgment in each category.
35. Id.
36. Note, 31 A.B. L. REV. 127, 128-29 (1967) (noting that a hybrid judgment only
bound class members of the certain property); see also Note, Procedural Devices For
Simplifying Litigation Stemming From a Mass Tort, 63 YALE L.J. 493 (1954) (discussing
the development of class actions in situations involving a common fund or property).
37. Although the spurious class rested on the community of interest theory of class
actions, it was not, in effect, a class since its binding effect only extended to those who
consented to the action. Id. at 510 (-In substance, the spurious class action is merely a
provision for permissive joinder of parties - an invitation to those wishing to enter an
action to do so.-).
38. Keefe, et al., supra note 29, at 330 (concluding -It]he classification which the rule
Rule 23 [sic] makes is dependent upon the jural relationships of the members of the
class").
39. Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District
Courts, 39 F.R.D. 73, 95-98 (1966) (Report of the Judicial Conference of the United
States with the Advisory Committee's Notes on the proposed rules). Although the Advi-
sory Committee Notes appear to reject the use of jural relationships as determinative in
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were an attempt to provide a much more practical approach to
defining a class.
Amended Rule 23 requires a court to apply a different stan-
dard than character or quality of jural relationships. A court apply-
ing amended Rule 23 must examine the nature of the claim or the
context in which the group is asserting rights to define the class.'
After satisfying the initial requirements of Rule 23(a), the group
may proceed under one of the contexts of subdivision (b). Subdivi-
sion (b) describes three broad situations in which a group may
assert rights as a class.41 By including this second level require-
ment, the drafters intended to describe "occasions for maintaining
class actions." 42 Describing the contexts in which class certifica-
tion is appropriate eliminates the extensive qualitative analysis
required under the original rule. However, this change in the rule
also has the- corresponding effect of returning some discretion to
courts to decide upon which theory to premise the class definition.
In other words, courts may examine a class for satisfaction of the
amended rule's requirements within either the common right or
community of interest framework.
I1. APPLICATION OF RuLE 23 AND CLASS DEFINITION
Rule 23 begins with a general definition of class actions con-
tained in subsection 23(a) followed by three subcategories found in
defining a class, a closer reading indicates that the committee rejected the qualitative ap-
proach. The drafters' concern is essentially focused on the practical problems which arise
in understanding what type of rights are present; The comments devote three full para-
graphs to a discussion of the various interpretational difficulties. The comments do not ar-
gue that the jural relationships are, ineffective at defining the class. Instead the amend-
ments attempted to provide a different, more qualitative approach. Id. at 98-107.
40. Id. at 99. The Committee further writes "[the amended rule describes in more
practical terms the occasions for maintaining class actions . . . ." Id. Additional indication
that a court considering a motion for certification must make findings regarding the unity
of the group when applying amended Rule 23 exists where the Committee describes the
various factors under subdivision (b)(3) relating to desirability of certification. The notes
state "these interests [contained in subdivisions (b)(3)(A)-(D)] may be theoretic rather than
practical: the class may have a high degree of cohesion and prosecution of the action
through representatives would be unobjectionable, or the amounts at stake for individuals
may be so small that separate suits would be impracticable." Id. at 104. The basic thrust
of these comments indicates that the amended rule only describes situations or contexts in
which class certification is appropriate. The court must supply its own test for finding the
unity and cohesion among the group.
41. Id. at 100 ("Subdivision (b) describes additional elements which in varying situa-
tions justify the use of a class action."). See supra note 4 for text of amended Rule
23(b).
42. Id. at 99.
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subsection 23(b). Section 23(a) specifies four prerequisites for all
class actions. These are (1) that the parties be too numerous for
individual joinder, (2) that common questions of law or fact exist
within the group, (3) that the group representatives have claims or
defenses typical of the class, and (4) that the representatives be
able to adequately represent the group's interests. 3
Subsection (b) is divided into three classifications or contexts.
After satisfying subsection (a), a particular category of subsection
(b) must be satisfied. Rule 23(b)(1) is essentially an expanded
version of the joinder provisions in Rule 19, since it covers situa-
tions in which all parties should be joined in order to render a
complete decision. Rule 23(b)(2) is intended to cover those situa-
tions in which the group seeks injunctive or declaratory relief.
Finally, Rule 23(b)(3) describes situations in which there are com-
mon questions of law and fact making a class action the most fair
and efficient means of pursuing judgment.
The prerequisites of subsection (a) are used initially to define
the group, and the requirements under subsection (b) provide a
vehicle for certifying different types of classes depending on the
circumstances." Unlike original Rule 23, the amended rule does
not require courts to engage in qualitative jural relationship analysis
to determine which type of class is appropriate, and, as a result,
the binding effect of the judgment which depended on the jural
relationship under the original rule.45 The Advisory Committee
Note to subdivision (b) provides that "all class actions maintained
to the end as such will result in judgments including those whom
the court finds to be members of the class ... ,46 Jural relation-
ships, however, are still relevant to class definition. Amended Rule
23 simply allows a court to choose which theory, the common
right or community of interest, is appropriate for defining the class.
III. PROBLEMS WITH PRACTICALITY
Although the amended rule's elimination of qualitative analysis
of jural relationships makes the rule more practical,47 it creates a
43. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
44. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) & (b), Advisory Committee's Note.
45. FED. R. CIv. P. 23, Advisory Committee's Note (stating that the original rule con-
tained defined categories of class actions which "in practice . . . proved obscure and
uncertain").
46. FED R. CIv. P. 23, Advisory Committee's Note (1966 Amendment).
47. Id. ("The amended rule describes in more practical terms the occasions for main-
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theoretical vacuum in which the courts are to operate. This gap
results because amended Rule 23 gives a court leeway to use either
theory for class definition without clearly- defining which theory it
is in fact using. In the original rule, the common right and com-
munity of interest theories were written into the rule. Consequently,
the nature of the rights asserted by the group determined which
theory the class was based upon. The value of the original rule
was that a particular class was, by operation of the rule, grounded
in one theory or the other.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Analyzing the theoretic difficulties described above under each
part of Rule 23, although possible, would be lengthy and repetitive.
Consequently, only selected provisions of the rule are explored
through the vehicle of mass tort case law.4" Specifically, this note
explores the commonality requirement of subsection (a)(2),49 the
predominance requirement of subsection (b)(3),50 and subsection
(b)(1)(B), the "limited fund" class action.5'
The problems resulting from Rule 23(a)(2), (b)(3) and
(b)(1)(B) are representative of the theoretical difficulties present
throughout the rule. These difficulties are the result of courts'
freedom to adopt either the common right or community of interest
theory of class definition when considering a motion for class
certification. 2
taiing class actions . . .
48. Mass tort cases are useful for examining Rule 23 because of the unique nature of
the mass tort. Under the amended rule, a court considering a motion for certification is
able to use either the common right theory or the community of interest theory, some-
times with different outcomes. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Thus, these cases
tend to exaggerate the lack of theoretical grounding now present in Rule 23.
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) provides, in part: "One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if . . . (2) there are ques-
tions of law or fact common to the class ... ."
50. Under subsection (b)(3), a class action may be maintained if the prerequisites of
23(a) are satisfied, and "the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy." FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3).
51. Under subsection (b)(l)(B), a class action may be maintained if the prerequisites of
23(a) are satisfied, and allowing separate actions would create a risk of "adjudications
with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be
dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or sub-
stantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests .... " FED. R. CIV. P.
23(b)(1)(B).
52. While any provision of the rule could be used for study, the corresponding rele-
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A. Commonality: 23(a)(2)
The judicial confusion created by the lack of a coherent ap-
proach to class definition appears in the evaluation of commonality
in Rule 23(a)(2). Read literally, this provision simply requires that
the group seeking certification demonstrate the presence of com-
mon questions of law and fact among the individuals.53 A finding
of common questions of law and fact is possible under either the
common right or community of interest theories. Under a common
right approach, the fact that each individual member of the group
is able to assert a common right creates a series of common ques-
tions. Common questions also appear under the community of
interest approach. This theory actually defines the class by means
of the common questions existing among the plaintiffs in relation
to the defendant.
As in the limited fund class action,"' the definitional theory
used by the court in examining this provision often determines
whether the requirement is fulfilled. Rule 23's lack of a coherent
theoretical approach to class definition manifests itself in the vary-
ing types of tests the courts devise and apply to the groups in
certification evaluation.55
vant cases would not contain enough discussion regarding the community of interest and
common right theories to permit solid conclusions due to the nature of the issues present
in non-tort cases. For example, in a shareholder's derivative suit brought as a class action,
the nature of the rights are so closely related that certification would follow under both
the common right and community of interest approaches. Consequently, the discussion
related to certification in such a case would generally not contain enough information
regarding which theory the court applied to grant certification. Thus, although the lack of
theoretical grounding in the amended rule's provisions does not disappear, the court's
basis for certification is obscured by the quality of the asserted rights.
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B). The limited fund class action is triggered where sepa-
rate actions "create a risk of . . . adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other mem-
bers not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to
protect their interest. ... Id. Professor Transgrud notes that the limited fund situation
occurs where the defendant may not be able to satisfy all of the claims brought by an
individual plaintiff due to insufficient assets. Trangsrud, supra note 28, at 794-95. The
class action thus "protects the interests of all claimants to the limited fund by preventing
its disbursal on a first-come, first-served basis." Id. at 795 (citations omitted).
55. For a discussion noting the importance of providing a clear analytic structure when
applying Rule 23, see Developments in the Law, supra note 23, at 1330 (1976). "The
various issues which class actions raise cannot be fully analyzed unless the connections
among the issues are explored. Some overarching conceptual framework is a necessary
prerequisite to an understanding of these connections." Id.
CLASS CERTIFICATION
In evaluating a group for commonality under Rule 23(a)(2),
the central issue facing the court is where to find the common
questions. The test used by the court to review the group for the
presence of common questions of law and fact belies its theoretical
approach. Consistent with the existence of the two primary theories
for class definition, the cases can be separated into two distinct
categories of review which correspond to the common right and
community of interest theories. These categories are referred to
here as the "close" review, indicating the use of the common right
theory, and the "liberal" review, correlating with the community of
interest approach. 6
1. Close Review
Courts following this type of review focus closely on the
individual members of the group, rather than on the group as a
whole. Such attention to' the individual members of the class is
indicative of the common right theory, which requires that each
individual in the group be able to assert the same right as any
other individual. This "close" review for commonality was used by
the court in the Dalkon Shield litigation.57
The Dalkon Shield case involved certification of both a nation-
wide punitive damages class and a California statewide liability
class of plaintiffs alleging injuries from use of the Dalkon Shield
intrauterine device.58 Regarding the statewide liability class, the
Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that commonality was
present concerning the issues "'of design, testing, manufacturing,
labeling and inspection of the Dalkon Shields." ' s9 However, the
circuit court went on to state that commonality did not exist, and
certification was denied regarding "issues of negligence, strict prod-
ucts liability, adequacy of warnings at relevant time periods, breach
of warranty, [and] fraud and conspiracy . . . ."' In its reasoning,
the court expressed concern that "[d]ifferent questions of law and
56. These terms are not meant to refer or relate to other works or terms from other
areas of the law. Any similarity between their meanings as defined in this paper and
other works is coincidental.
57. In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Lib. Litig., 693 F.2d 847 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
58. Id. at 848. Certification of the class for the nationwide action on the issue of
punitive damages was determined pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and for the statewide ac-
tion on the issue of liability was determined pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3). Id.
59. Id. at 854 (quoting the district court, 526 F. Supp. 887, 900 (1981)).
60. Id.
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fact could apply to various plaintiffs . "..."61 In essence, there
were many rights involved and all the plaintiffs could not assert
the same rights.
Similar to the district court, the circuit court used the same
approach of concentrating its analysis on the individual members of
the group while evaluating the punitive damages class.62 The court
held that questions regarding the defendants' knowledge of the
product's safety risks, information kept from the public, and in-
formation contained in the defendants' advertising were not com-
mon to all plaintiffs.63 As in the liability class analysis, the
court's examination focused on individual plaintiffs, and because
the court found that each plaintiff could not claim the same rights
as all others, commonality was not found. 64
This close scrutiny of the nature of the rights each individual
member of a potential class asserts suggests the application of the
common right theory. The common right theory requires the court
to examine carefully the individual rights asserted to insure they
are the same. If all rights are not the same, commonality is not
present. In contrast, the community of interest theory allows a
court to determine whether questions common to all of the claim-
ants are predicated on a common nucleus of operative facts. Focus-
ing on operative facts in the Dalkon Shield case may have permit-
ted a finding of common issues, including negligence. Consequent-
ly, although Rule 23(a)(2) appears objective, the manner in which
a court understands and defines a class determines the characteris-
tics which the group must exhibit to be granted certification.
Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co. is another example of close judicial
review.65 This case involved class certification of a group of fe-
males injured by their mothers' use of Diethylistellbestrol (DES)
during pregnancy. The court conducted the Rule 23(a)(2) analysis
simultaneously with the predominance analysis under Rule 23(b)(3),
indicating that the sole difference between the two was one of
stringency. 66 The standard is essentially the same for both provi-
sions, except that Rule 23(b)(3) commonality requires predomi-
61. Id. (noting that "different representations and warnings [were] made to each wom-
an, different injuries suffered, and different defenses [were] available to [the defendant]").
Id.
62. Id. at 850.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 84 F.R.D. 230, 232-33 (D.S.C. 1979).
66. Id. at 231.
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nance of common questions.' The court held that individual is-
sues did not predominate and that commonality deficiencies in
liability issues could not be cured because "individual proof as to
each party . . ." was required.6 ' The court went on to explain that
evidence of causation also prevented a finding of commonality
because "so much in the way of individual proof by each of the
class members will obviously be required." 69
As in Dalkon Shield, the Ryan court's certification analysis
focuses on the individual members of the group. The concern with
individualized proof is consistent with the fact that the members of
the group do not share a common right. The need to demonstrate a
high degree of individual proof reflects the lack of a common
right. Rights which are several and distinct prevent a finding of
commonality under a common right approach.
The demand for individualized proof is consistent with the
community of interest theory. This approach considers the common
questions arising from the subject matter rather than the rights
themselves. Consequently, individualized proof poses no threat to
class certification when the court is applying the community of
interest approach.
67. One treatise describes the relationship of these two subdivisions as follows:
lAin action is maintainable under Rule 23(b)(3) only if there is a finding that
common questions predominate over individual issues. Since this obviously is a
more stringent standard than that prescribed by Rule 23(a)(2), subdivision (a)(2)
would be satisfied any time the court finds that subdivision (b)(3) test has been
met. Not surprisingly, therefore, a few courts in actions brought under subdivi-
sion (b)(3) have not drawn a distinction between the two requirements. They
either have dealt with the common-issue question simultaneously with their
inquiry into whether common questions predominate or have assumed that Rule
23(a)(2) was satisfied and thought it necessary only to rule on the question
whether the suit fit within subdivision (b)(3).
7A CHARLEs A. WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1763 at 227-28
(2d ed. 1986).
This simultaneous analysis is not suggested by the rule, however. The provisions of
Rule 23 are clearly divided between subsections (a) and (b), which suggests the evaluation
of commonality under (a) should be distinct from that under (b). In fact, although noting
that some courts consider (a)(2) and (b)(3) together, Professors Wright and Miller suggest
that the provisions are to be considered separately.
What is clear, however, is that it is not sufficient that common questions mere-
ly exist, as is true for purposes of Rule 23(a)(2), and that the court is under a
duty to evaluate the relationship between the common and individual issues in
all actions under Rule 23(b)(3).
Id. § 1778.
68. Ryan, 84 F.RD. at 233.
69. Id.
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2. Liberal Review
Class certification under liberal review suggests a community
of interest approach as opposed to common right. Under the com-
munity of interest approach, a broader approach to commonality is
manifested by the nature of the court's examination. In Jenkins v.
Raymnark, Industries, Inc. ,70 the court, analyzing commonality un-
der Rule 23(a)(2), certified a class of plaintiffs claiming injuries
from asbestos. The court held that common issues
include the questions of when the asbestos manufacturers
and distributors became aware or should have become
aware of any health risks associated with the use of asbes-
tos products; what steps, if any, they took to ameliorate the
risks; and whether or not their actions in ameliorating the
risks or failing to ameliorate the risks warrant the imposi-
tion of punitive damages.71
The importance of the court's inquiry lies in the type of questions
asked of the members of the putative class.
In Jenkins, the examination turned on whether the issues them-
selves were common to the group and not simply the rights
claimed by particular individuals. The court held that
"[c]ertification of a class of pending asbestos-related personal injury
suits allows the trier of fact the opportunity to resolve the 'state of
the art' issues in one trial ... ."' The court's clear concern was
that commonality result from the issues instead of the rights as-
serted by individuals.
While the focus of the common right approach is the individu-
al, the community of interest approach examines the issues them-
selves and the subject matter of the case. Even though the ques-
tions must still be common to the group to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2),
the commonality may result from varying underlying fact patterns.
In a common right approach the underlying facts must be exactly
the same to give rise to a common right, and in turn, fulfill the re-
quirements of commonality. Consequently, the approach the court
uses in applying the prerequisites of Rule 23(a)(2) determines
where the commonality is located.
70. 109 F.R.D. 269, 271-72 (E.D. Tex. 1985), affd, 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986).




Another difference created by a community of interest approach
is that the amount of commonality necessary to satisfy Rule
23(a)(2) appears to be diminished. In Axelrod v. Saks & Co.,73
the plaintiffs, a group of charge account customers of the defen-
dants, alleged anti-trust violations seeking treble damages. 4 Dis-
cussing the Rule 23(a)(2) requirement, the court held "not every
question of fact and law must be common to every member of the
class."75 This lower threshold of commonality was also approved
in Jenkins.
76
A court employing a community of interest approach defines
the class through common questions. The common questions arise
from similar, although somewhat varying fact patterns. The typical
standard for fact patterns requires a nucleus of operative fact.
Slight individual variations do not preclude certification with com-
munity of interest. By contrast, common right theory requires the
rights of each individual to be exactly the same. Achieving a level
of common rights requires nearly all of the underlying facts to be
the same for all the individuals. Deviations in the facts lead to
distinct and several rights, thus preventing class definition, and by
extension, class certification.
The differences between courts employing the close review and
those using the liberal review may result from other factors. In
some instances, the courts may simply have devised different tests
to determine when the requirements for Rule 23(a)(2) have been
met according to interpretational differences unrelated to class
definition. The court may be concerned with other factors to some
extent, however, each of the courts employing the restrictive test
also express concerns about the cohesiveness of the group seeking
certification. This concern for class definition, more than mere
interpretational differences, appears to drive the analysis under the
restrictive test.
Moreover, the different results reached among the jurisdictions
concerning which test to employ appear to divide into two factions.
73. 77 F.R.D. 441 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
74. Although an anti-trust action is not directly analogous to a mass tort situation, the
theories of class definition still apply. Generally, the effects associated with class defini-
tion theory are more pronounced and easier to describe in the mass tort context. The ef-
fects, however, are present in all class actions.
75. Id. at 444 (quoting Fox v. Prudent Resources Trust, 69 F.R.D. 74, 78 (E.D. Pa.
1974)).
76. Jenkins, 109 F.R.D. at 272 (explaining that the commonality requirement "does not
mandate that all issues be common, only that common issues exist").
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If the courts are concerned about other factors, more than two
standards would likely arise. Since two tests arise in the opinions
and indicafe two distinct standards, claiming other factors are re-
sponsible for the differences in the decisions and tests implies the
relationship of the theories to the decisions is merely coincidental.
Such a coincidence seems unlikely, especially given the fact that
the differences occur in a number of provisions of Rule 23. Al-
though other factors could account for some of the disparities, the
fact that two distinct theories emerge and each court expressed
concerns regarding the cohesiveness of the group, the decisions
reflect the court's choice of either the common right or community
of interest theory to class certification.
B. Predominance: 23(b)(3)
Motions to certify classes in mass tort cases are most common
under Rule 23(b)(3).77 This provision contains two explicit re-
quirements: that the court finds that common questions predominate
and that the class action is the superior method of adjudication
given the specific situation.7 8 Courts tend to focus on the com-
monality factor. Presumably, if common questions predominate, the
class action will be the superior method of adjudication. Yet,
Rule 23(b)(3) fails to answer the central question of how a court
77. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986); In re Federal Sky-
walk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1985); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 100
F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods.
Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982); it re Three Mile Island Litig., 87 F.R.D. 433
(M.D. Pa 1980); Yandle v. PPG Indus., Inc., 65 F.R.D. 566, 572 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
78. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3). The predominance analysis under (b)(3) is aimed at
ensuring that the class action is appropriate. It is thus a more stringent standard that
found in subsection (a)(2), which is merely a prerequisite. See supra note 67 and accom-
panying text. Consequently, although the predominance and commonality requirement tend
to focus on the same general characteristics, common questions of law and fact, their
purposes are very distinct. Rule 23(a)(2) is merely a prerequisite while subsection (b)(3)
exists as a safeguard against certifying a class where the group is not cohesive enough to
justify such treatment. MOORE, supra note 33, § 23,45[2].
79. 7A WRIGHT, et al., supra note 67, § 1777 (A finding that common questions [in a
Rule 23(b)(3). action] predominate insures that the claims of the class members "will be
sufficiently similar so that adjudication by representation will be appropriate.") (citations
omitted) (emphasis added). The attempt to achieve a balance between individual actions
and collective litigation is the basic conflict involved with class definition. If the court
finds adequate commonality for the group to constitute a class, individual resolution, al-
though possible, becomes an inferior method of adjudication.
The predominance test may also be used to delimit the proper scope of the action
under subdivision (c). Subdivision (c) permits separating common issues from the action
as a whole for class action treatment. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c).
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should decide whether the parties are sufficiently similar to adjudi-
cate as a class. The manner in which the court defines commonali-
ty, either through a community of interest or common right ap-
proach, is determinative of whether a class will be certified under
Rule 23(b)(3).
In making their decisions under this provision, courts generally
employ a pragmatic balancing test." Under this test, common
questions need not resolve all of the issues being litigated.8' Pro-
fessors Wright and Miller summarize the pragmatic balancing test
in the following manner:
The common questions need not be dispositive of the entire
action. In other words, "predominate" should not be auto-
matically equated with "determinative" or "significant."
Therefore, when one or more of the central issues in the
action are common to the class and can be said to predom-
inate, the action will be considered proper under Rule
23(b)(3) even though other important matters will have to
be tried separately.82
The pragmatic balancing test weighs the common questions and
the individual questions. However, it does not determine which
characteristics of the group of individuals a court should explore to
determine if common questions predominate. The court is left to
approach the test from either the common right or community of
interest perspective. The approach the court takes in applying the
pragmatic balancing test to assess whether common questions pre-
80. See WRIGHT et al., supra note 67, § 1778, at 552 (discussing the tests used by
courts to determine whether common questions predominate over individual issues). Other
tests are available for determining when predominance is present. For example, some
courts use a time-comparison test. However, this test has fallen into a degree of disfavor.
It involves determining whether the amount of time spent litigating the common questions
will exceed that amount of time spent on individual issues. See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott
Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 391 (D.C. Mass. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 100 F.R.D. 336
(1983). Professor Moore notes that "[a] quantitative test, comparing the amount of time
and attention required for settlement of the common questions with that needed to con-
clude individual matters, has properly been rejected as a measure for this element of a
(b)(3) action." MOoRE, supra note 33, § 23.45[2]. Professor Moore also discredits the
outcome determinative test. Under this test, courts "findl] 'predominant' those common
questions whose determination would conclude the mass of disputes." Id. Professor Moore
is dissatisfied with the outcome determinative test, which applies criteria similar to those
used to assess the finality of a judgment and thus "would essentially substitute
'significant' for 'predominant."' Id.
81. Jenkins, 109 F.R.D. at 278 (quoting 7A WRIGHT, et al., supra note 67, § 1777).
82. 7A WRIGHT, et al., supra note 67 § 1778; see also Jenkins, 109 F.R.D. at 278.
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dominate largely determines whether or not certification will be
granted to the group. Where a court uses the community of interest
theory in applying the pragmatic balancing test, certification is
granted to the group. In contrast, courts which apply a common
rights approach in conjunction with the pragmatic balancing test do
not grant certification.
For example, in In re Asbestos School Litigation, 3 the court
approached the pragmatic balancing test from the community of
interest perspective. In particular, the court focused on questions
arising from a common nucleus of operative fact."4 The plaintiffs
alleged six claims for damages, "negligence, strict liability, breach
of warranty, intentional tort, concert of action and civil conspira-
cy." 85 The court noted that these claims arose "out of the same
common nucleus of operative facts relating to defendants' conduct
and the nature of asbestos products." 6 On the issue of causation,
the court held "'there is no reason . . . why proof of [causation]
cannot be made on a common basis so long as the common proof
adequately demonstrates some damage to each individual.'
87
Moreover, the court held that the legal issue of proximate causation
"can be resolved on a classwide basis without involving individual-
ized, class-member by class-member proof."8' 8 This finding would
not have been possible under a common right approach. A finding
of predominance is possible only from the community of interest
approach, since the interest which binds the group is the common
subject matter.
By focusing on the questions which arose from a common
nucleus of operative facts, the court found a predominance of com-
mon questions.89 Applying the pragmatic balancing test in this
83. 104 F.R.D. 422 (E.D. Pa. 1984). This case was an a mass toxic tort resulting from
asbestos. The plaintiffs asserted no right common to each of them. Instead, each was
injured separately. However, the court found sufficient cohesion for class definition under
the community of interest theory.
84. Id. at 431-32. This standard, requiring a common nucleus of operative fact, is
"very similar to that used to determine the application of the doctrine of pendent jurisdic-
tion." 7A WRIGHT, et al., supra note 67, § 1778.
85. Asbestos School Litig., 104 F.R.D. at 432.
86. Id.
87. Id. (quoting Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 454 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978) (emphasis omitted)).
88. Id. at 432. The ability to determine damages on a classwide basis has been dis-
puted in the past. 5 HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, § 8824(b), at
879 (1977). The question now appears to be resolved.
89. Asbestos School Litig., 104 F.R.D. at 432.
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manner is consistent with the community of interest theory, which
probes the group on the level of common questions and not on the
level of common rights.
In contrast, courts that have not found a predominance of com-
mon questions of law or fact apply the pragmatic balancing test
from the common right perspective of class definition. Decisions
which deny class certification discuss the individual members of
the group instead of concentrating on the subject matter of the
claims. In re Fibreboard Corporation involved class certification
of a large group of plaintiffs claiming injury from asbestos. Dis-
cussing the element of causation, Judge Higgenbotham opined:
A contemplated "trial" of the 2,990 class members without
discrete focus can be no more than the testimony of ex-
perts regarding their claims, as a group, compared to the
claims actually tried to the jury. That procedure cannot
focus upon such issues as individual causation, but ulti-
mately must accept general causation as sufficient ....
Commonality among class members on issues of causation
and damages can be achieved only by lifting the descrip-
tion of the claims to a level of generality that tears them
from their substantively required moorings to actual causa-
tion and discrete injury.9
The Fibreboard court's focus on the individual and the claims
the individual could assert suggests that the court used the common
right approach to class definition. Judge Higgenbotham's concerns
revolved around the discrete members of the group. Since each
person could not assert the exact same right as every other person,
the court concluded that the group was not sufficiently cohesive for
class status.92 Realistically, in the area of mass tort class certifica-
tion, every individual will assert a separate bundle of rights. It will
90. 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990).
91. Id. at 711-12.
92. Similar reasoning can be found in In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield
LU.D. Prod. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171
(1983). The Dalkon Shield court refused to certify the class:
No single happening or accident occurs to cause similar types of harm or
property damage. No one set of operative facts establishes liability. No single
proximate cause applies equally to each potential class member and each defen-
dant. Furthermore, the alleged tortfeasor's affirmative defenses (such as failure
to follow directions, assumption of the risk, contributory negligence, and statutes
of limitations) may depend on facts peculiar to each plaintiff's case.
Id. at 853; see also Yandle v. PPG Indus. Inc., 65 F.R.D. 566 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
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never be possible to certify a mass tort class in a court that fol-
lows the common right approach to the pragmatic balancing test to
determine if there is a predominance of common questions of law
and fact. 93
Judge Higgenbotham's conclusion that commonality sufficient
to constitute predominance can only be achieved by generalizing
the claims of each individual plaintiff is consistent with a common
right approach. To find the necessary predominance of common
questions under the common right approach, a court would look to
the rights of the individual plaintiffs. In the Fibreboard case, the
plaintiff's rights only appeared common on a general level. After
closer inspection of the rights in question, it became apparent that
the rights were several and distinct. Only by generalizing the rights
could the necessary commonality be found. Judge Higgenbotham
was unwilling to do this. Thus, in employing the common right
approach to the question of predominance, the court refused to
certify the class.
Had the court followed the community of interest approach, the
analysis would have focused on the claims or rights arising from a
common nucleus of operative fact. Examining the group's asserted
rights in this manner would have permitted the class members to
assert several and distinct rights. The community of interest ap-
proach would have focused on whether the plaintiffs claims arose
out of "the same common nucleus of operative facts relating to
defendants' conduct and the nature of the asbestos product." 94
Consequently, the community of interest theory would likely have
permitted certification in this situation.
C. The Limited Fund
A number of mass tort cases" seek class certification under
Rule 23(b)(1)(B). 96 Under this provision, a class action is deemed
93. Compare mass tort plaintiffs with tenants-in-common. In the latter case, a class
could be found under the common right theory since each plaintiff would be asserting a
claim based on his shared status against a tortfeasor who injured common property. In
contrast, mass tort plaintiffs each have a unique relationship to the tortfeasor although the
harm may differ.
94. Asbestos School Litig., 104 F.R.D. at 432.
95. See, e.g., La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1973);
Jenkins v. Raymark, 109 F.R.D 269 (E.D. Tex. 1985); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab.
Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass.
1979), vacated on other grounds, 100 F.R.D. 336 (1983).
96. A class action is maintainable under this provision, if after having satisfied the
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appropriate when individual actions might be dispositive of the
interests of others. In the mass tort context, the limited fund theory
is based on the concern that parties who bring their individual
actions may deplete the defendant's resources, leaving no money
for future claimants to collect.
In various situations an adjudication as to one or more
members of the class will necessarily or probably have an
adverse practical effect on the interests of other members
who should therefore be represented in the lawsuit. This is
plainly the case when claims are made by numerous per-
sons against a fund insufficient to satisfy all claims. A
class action by or against representative members io settle
the validity of the claims as a whole, or in groups, fol-
lowed by separate proof of the amount of each valid claim
and proportionate distribution of the fund, meets the prob-
lem.97
At first blush, the applicability of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) to certify a
class when there is a limited fund appears straightforward. Howev-
er on the class definition level, disparities arise among various
courts. These disparities manifest themselves in the nature of the
tests adopted by the courts to determine whether a limited fund ex-
ists. At present, two types of tests are performed by the courts, a
liberal test and a restrictive test.98 The liberal test correlates to the
use of the community of interest theory while the restrictive test
prerequisites of 23(a):
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would
as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not
parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to
protect their interests ....
FED. P. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
97. Prop. FED. R. CIV. P., 39 F.R.D. 69, 101 (1966).
Limited fund class actions are permitted in a wide variety of cases. 1 NEWBERG, su-
pra note 88, § 1140. However, the judiciary is reluctant to certify classes in the mass tort
scenario. Transgrud, supra note 28, at 795. The trend among courts is to permit separate
actions to determine the rights of later claimants. La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan
Company, 480 F.2d 461, 467 (1973) ("The success or failure of the plaintiffs in their
individual actions will not inescapably alter the rights of others similarly situated.").
98. These terms do not necessary refer to other works or terms from other areas of
the law. As such, any similarity between their meanings as defined in this paper and
other works is coincidental.
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indicates the common right approach by the courts.
The liberal test, which applies a standard of "substantial proba-
bility" to determine whether a limited fund exists, originated in In
re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation." This case involved
the certification of a group of plaintiffs claiming injury from the
defoliate "Agent Orange." Under the substantial probability test, the
court evaluated the defendant's worth and ability to pay judgments
relative to an estimated total value of the group's claims,0 ° A
substantial probability is applied as the standard of proof in evalu-
ating the significance of the values.' Judge Weinstein summa-
rized the substantial probability standard: "the proper standard is
whether there is substantial probability - that is less than a pre-
ponderance but more the a mere possibility - that if damages are
awarded, the claims, of earlier litigants would exhaust the
defendant's assets."'1 2
In contrast, classes seeking certification under the restrictive
test for limited funds must demonstrate that "individual action
inescapably will alter the substance of the rights of others having
similar claims." 0 3 The Ninth Circuit developed the restrictive test
99. 100 F.RILD. 718, 724-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), afftd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
100. Id. at 727-28. Cf. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 109 F.R.D. 269, 276 (E.D. Tex.
1985) (recognizing that the defendant's money may have run out at some point, the court
compared the value of the pending cases against the estimated pool of resources), aff'd,
782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986); In re Asbestos School Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422, 437 (E.D.
Pa. 1984) (conditionally certifying the class under 23(b)(1)(B) because of the substantial
possibility that early punitive damage awards in individual cases would impair later
litigants' ability to recover); vacated on other grounds, 789 F.2d 996, 1005 (3d Cir.
1986) (vacating the certification because the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
make factual findings on the amount and scope of potential punitive damage claims);
Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 389 (D. Mass. 1979) (refusing to certify the class
under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) because the plaintiffs failed to prove that the available fund would
be insufficient to satisfy all claims), vacated on other grounds, 100 F.R.D. 336 (1983).
101. Agent Orange, 100 F.R.D. at 725-28.
102. Id. at 726.
103. La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 467 (9th Cit. 1973). Al-
though this case was a class action brought under the Truth in Lending Act, the court's
Rule 23 analysis has precedential value for all class actions and, in particular, mass tort
actions in the Ninth Circuit. See also In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield I.U.D.
Prod. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that Rule 23(b)(1)(B) cer-
tification is proper only when separate punitive damage claims necessarily will affect later
claims), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. U.S. Dist.
Court, C.D. of Cal., 523 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1975) (permitting class certification
under 23(b)(1)(B) only if separate actions -inescapably will alter the substance of the
rights of others having similar claims-), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976).
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in La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Comnpany °4 The La Mar
court reasoned that by alleging a limited fund, the plaintiffs would
be able to bootstrap their motion for certification because any
action against a fund has the potential to alter the rights of subse-
quent litigants simply by depleting the fund. 5 The courts that
apply the highly restrictive standard for determination of limited
fund appear concerned that a loosely related group of individuals
may be able to satisfy the prerequisites of Rule 23(a)(2), thereby
allowing them to achieve class status too easily under Rule
23(b)(l)(B). Because the prerequisites in subdivision (a) are not
intended to be very demanding standards, most groups can satisfy
the provisions, and yet not be very cohesive. However, under the
liberal test, satisfaction of those requirements defines the group as
a class if a limited fund is found. One method of preventing loose-
ly defined groups from gaining class status is to impose very high
standards on the determination of a limited fund, as the restrictive
approach has done.
An example of restrictive analysis is found in In re Northern
District of California, Dalkon Shield IUD Products Liability Litiga-
tion." 6  The plaintiffs seeking class certification under Rule
23(b)(1)(B) did not satisfy the prerequisites of subdivision (a). 7
While discussing the group's failure to fulfill the requirements of
Rule 23(a), the Circuit Court noted that given the right circum-
stances, each of the provisions could be satisfied, and class certifi-
cation under 23(b)(1)(B) might be possible."'S
104. La Mar, 489 F.2d at 467.
105. Id.; see also Andrew C. Rose, Note, Federal Mass Tort Class Actions: A Step To-
ward Equity and Efficiency, 47 ALB. L. REV. 1180 (1983). Rose noted:
If individual actions were allowed to proceed in such cases (mass torts), plain-
tiffs who sued first would deplete the defendant's resources, leaving subsequent
plaintiffs without a remedy.
In mass tort cases there is often extensive injury to a great number of
people and, as a result, the total damages claimed are likely to be enormous.
Despite the existence of insurance coverage, the tremendous amount of mone-
tary claims makes the exhaustion of the defendant's financial resources a very
real possibility.
[Moreover] [t]he tremendous litigation costs that would be incurred by a
defendant if it were forced to defend a multitude of individual tort suits further
contributes to the likelihood of a limited fund. Such costs could accelerate the
depletion of an already limited fund or create a limited fund where none previ-
ously existed.
Id. at 1199-1201.
106. 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 1171 (1983).
107. Id. at 850-51.
108. Id. at 851 ("We are not necessarily ruling out the class action tool as a means for
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However, reviewing the court's reasoning in assessing whether
the prerequisites of 23(a) had been met reveals a reluctance to find-
that the subsection (a) criteria had been satisfied. Regarding the
commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2), the court decided that
"[i]f commonality were the only problem in this case, it might be
possible to sustain some kind of punitive damage class."1°9 In
connection with Rule 23(a)(3), the court similarly held "typicality
alone might not be an insurmountable problem.""' The court fur-
ther noted that the adequacy or representation problem could also
be resolved by the selection of adequate counsel to replace the re-
signing counsel."' The court pointedly acknowledged the fact
that prerequisites can be satisfied given the appropriate facts."'
The courts which apply the Ninth Circuit's standard in a limit-
ed fund context cite concern that loosely related groups could
achieve class status with relative ease under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) as
one of the reasons for creating such a high standard for applying
that provision. The "bootstrap" effect of the provision in a mass
tort context has also led some courts to impose a more stringent
standard in determining whether the prerequisites of Rule 23(a)
have been satisfied. Courts applying the community of interest
theory easily satisfy the 23(a) requirements. Thus, some courts will
apply the common right theory to the 23(a) prerequisites to ensure
that class certification is not available to loosely related groups
under 23(b)(1)(B). Unfortunately, Rule 23 does not provide any
guidance on whether the liberal or restrictive test should be applied
in assessing certification under 23(b)(1)(B), leaving the courts wide
discretion to create differing tests depending on their concerns
related to class definition under 23(a), as well as 23(b)(1)(B).
D. Preliminary Conclusions
The essence of class definition is the need to develop a frame-
work in which to understand the relationships of a group of peo-
ple. Such a framework provides structure and coherence for inter-
expediting multi-party product liability in appropriate cases.").
109. Id. at 850 (noting that there were common questions including knowledge as to the
product's safety, the information withheld from the public and doctors and the instructions
provided).
110. Id. (suggesting, however, that typicality could be a "significant" problem, making it
difficult to rationalize class treatment for the group).




preting whether the characteristics of a group are sufficient to grant
certification. As seen earlier, creating such a structure is the result
of the highly individual nature of the common law. The common
law's emphasis on individual adjudication makes the class action a
kind of an anomaly in litigation because of its collective nature.
Since the class action must function within an individualist struc-
ture, courts developed doctrines to justify the use of a class for lit-
igation. The fundamental assumption of these doctrines is that the
more the individual members of a class resemble one another, the
more likely class status would be granted.
Amended Rule 23 attempts to describe, in very practical terms,
situations appropriate for class action treatment. By providing such
practical examples, amended Rule 23, unlike original Rule 23,
became susceptible to application under either the common right
theory or the community of interest theory. As a result, motions
for class certification are subject to the particular theory of class
definition subscribed to by the court.
The lack of a single theoretical grounding in amended Rule 23
results in a division of holdings along the lines of the community
of interest and common right theories. Of course, the theoretical
gap in Rule 23 is not the only explanation for the disparities
among the federal circuits in granting or denying class certification.
However, the theories do play a fundamental role in determining
how courts apply Rule 23's provision.
V. EXAMINATION OF THE CLASS DEFINITION
In the first four sections, the common right theory and the
community of interest theory were treated as separate and distinct
from each other. Their development was briefly traced through
original Rule 23 and the case law involving amended Rule 23. A
more detailed analysis of the common right and community of
interest approaches and the perspective in which they are applied is
needed to more comprehensively understand the nature of the class
definition process itself.
In examining the philosophical underpinnings of the definition
process as well as the perspective, or epistemological framework,
from which it is understood, the present distinctions shrink in
importance. The value of such an analysis manifests itself here in a
proposal of a different perspective in which to use the theories.
This epistemological perspective will allow for the creation of a
more uniform approach to class definition, thus eliminating the
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present disparities in the case law.
A. The Common Right and Community of Interest Structures
Under the common right theory, a court finds class cohesion
when multiple parties share and assert the very same rights.'
13
All members of the group are in privity with one another by virtue
of possession of a common right.114 The existence of privity per-
mits the group to act as a class because it allows the court to treat
all the individuals as a single unit. s All parties stand in the
same relationship.
The existence of privity allows the group to litigate as a class
despite the fact that the group is actually composed of separate
individuals. More clearly, privity means each individual is claiming
the same right in relation to a common subject matter as all other
individuals in the class." 6
Although a right in relation to a common subject matter is a
type of claim, it also functions as a label. The labeling aspects of
a right in relation to a common subject matter elucidate much vital
information about the class definition process. As a label, a right in
relation to a common subject matter encompasses a large number
of individual aspects or dimensions about a particular person. To
illustrate, an individual who has a right in relation to a subject
occupies a particular point in time. As a label, the right defines the
person as having a relationship with the subject matter uniquely
different from those who do not have the right. Possession of the
right also implies the individual has a particular desire regarding
the subject matter. In short, .possession of a right in relation to a
common subject matter has the function of describing, along nu-
merous dimensions, the position of the individual; it describes a
person's orientation.
The term "orientation," although descriptive, is unfortunately
similar to the term "label" in that both are only useful as a com-
posite of the basic dimensions of the possessor of the right. How-
113. 1 POMEROY, supra note 27, § 255 at 434-35.
114. Id. § 251 at 407-408 (noting that the privity relationship was traditionally the
fundamental element in allowing an equity court to assume jurisdiction in cases involving
multiple plaintiffs and/or defendants).
115. See C.C. Langdell, A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction: (VII) Creditors' Bills, 5
HARV. L. REV. 101, 109 (1891) (describing the administration of a decedent's estate in a
court of equity where all creditors' claims are satisfied in one proceeding).
116. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1199 (6th ed. 1990).
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ever, the basic characteristics of an individual who claims a right
in relation to a common subject matter are the defining terms of
the class under the common right theory.
The community of interest approach to determining when a
group may be certified as a class functions differently than the
common right theory. Where the common right theory identifies
and orients a person based on a right in relation to a common
subject matter, the community of interest structure examines the
questions arising from a common subject matter. Using questions
in relation to a common subject matter fundamentally changes the
relationships of the individuals constituting the group. Most impor-
tantly, no privity exists among the individuals in the community of
interest approach. Nonetheless, the theory serves to describe a
person's orientation with regard to a certain subject matter. The
common questions thus act as the unifying force, which binds all
members of the group.
Similar to the common right structure, the questions in relation
to the subject matter are, at bottom, a label which describes or
communicates information. They inform others about many discrete
aspects of the person. When a person is found to have questions in
relation to a common subject matter, that individual's relationship
to others is identified, and it is possible to determine whether class
certification is appropriate based on that orientation.
The characteristics contained within any particular orientation,
whether a right in relation to a common subject matter or questions
in relation to a common subject matter, are the building blocks of
a class. People having the same orientation, by virtue of their
possession of the same right in relation to a subject matter or
question in relation to a common subject matter, exhibit the same
characteristics. The similarity provides the cohesion and permits the
individuals to litigate as a class based on their similarity to one
another. That is, they are closely related enough to act as one in
litigation. t7 The remaining difficulty is understanding the nature
of these basic characteristics.
B. Epistemological Foundation
Arriving at the basic characteristics which ultimately describe a
117. See supra text accompanying notes 16-22 (analyzing the need for individuals to be
as closely related to one another as possible in order to litigate in the highly individual-
ized common law structure).
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person's orientation is accomplished by means of "analysis." The
concept of "analysis as tool" is used to break down complex ideas
into simpler ones. For example, analysis was applied to the term
"right in relation to a subject matter" to determine its contents, or
more precisely, the simpler terms which combine to define it. The
simpler terms are merely the discrete characteristics which describe
the person possessing it. Understood in this manner, the process of
definition is essentially analysis of compound ideas."" Conse-
quently, all labels are logically superfluous since the basic charac-
teristics may always be substituted for compound ideas." 9 In this
sense, privity is actually an abbreviation for a complex or bundle
of ideas elucidated through analysis.' The importance of the
conception of definition as analysis is that it is premised on the
idea that, at some point, basic terms are arrived at which cannot be
further defined through analysis.121 These basic terms are the
building blocks upon which an alternative framework for definition
is constructed.
C. Theory of Family Resemblances
Ludwig Wittgenstein investigated how concepts and ideas are
recognized and understood, creating what he called the "Theory of
Family Resemblances." He explored the essence or nature of a
basic concept,"2  for example, a legal class.' 3 Definition as
analysis would hold that individuals are part of a class if they have
some common characteristic. All individuals possessing a common
118. See BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PRINCIPLES OF MATHEMATICS 27 (2d ed. 1937)
(distinguishing "definition" in philosophy from mathematics by positing that in philosophy
definition is "an analysis of the idea to be defined into constituent ideas ...whereas in
mathematics it is possible to define terms which are not concepts").
119. The same is true for the community of interest approach. Analysis is used to de-
termine the content or definition of questions in relation to a common subject matter. The
separate characteristics of a person labeled as having questions in relation to a common
subject matter could always be substituted for the label without any loss of meaning.
Consequently, questions in relation to a common subject matters merely describe the bun-
dle of individual characteristics of the person.
120. 1 GoRDoN P. BAKER & P.M.S. HACKER, wITTGrNSTEIN: UNDERSTANDING AND
MEANING 185-86 (1980) (believing that this conception of definition as analysis is an
essential and almost unquestioned principle of classical or orthodox Western philosophy).
121. Id. at 186-89.
122. LUDWIG WITGFNSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 31 (1953).
123. Since Wittgenstein discussed concepts generally, his concern with the legal concept




characteristic or set of characteristics of a class creates the class.
The individuals constitute a class because the class is defined as
those individuals containing common discrete characteristics deter-
mined either under the common right or community of interest
theories. However, the class is defined as those people possessing
the required characteristics. Consequently, the defining process is,
at bottom, circular.
Wittgenstein argued that basic concepts "have no one thing in
common which makes us use the same word for all, - but that
they are related to one another in many different ways. And it is
because of this relationship, or these relationships, that we call
them 'language.'"' 24 Wittgenstein explained that a series of lan-
guage games are all identifiable as language, not because the
games had common traits but because of the relationships between
and among the different games.1 5 Recognizing the difficulty of
understanding this theory in the abstract, Wittgenstein illustrated by
analogizing to the basic concept of a game. He compared a number
of games such as "board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic
games, and so on," 26 and asked himself what permitted recogni-
tion of an activity as a game. Asserting that nothing is common to
all games, he argued that defining a game is actually accomplished
by recognition of a complicated series of similarities and rela-
tionships with other activities.
Look for example at board-games, with their multifarious
relationships. Now pass to card-games; here you find many
correspondences with the first group, but many common
features drop out, and others appear. When we pass next to
ball-games, much that is common is retained, but much is
lost.-Are they all 'amusing'? Compare chess with noughts
and crosses. Or is there always winning and losing, or
competition between players? Think of patience. In ball-
games there is winning and losing; but when a child
throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature
has disappeared." 7
Applying Wittgenstein's epistemology, the definition of a class
does not lie in locating the individual common properties which
124. WrTrGENSTEIN, supra note 123.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 31-32.
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underlie the concept of a class. Instead, an individual is a member
of a class by virtue of having a number of overlapping similarities,
and relationships. That is, the web of individual common proper-
ties, not the individual common properties themselves, provide the
definition. No one basic dimension, characteristic or set of charac-
teristics is discretely sufficient to make an individual a member of
the class. In practice, a group is actually recognized as a class,
under common right or community of interest theories when the
individuals exhibit numerous similar characteristics.
However, under the family resemblance theory no designated
characteristic or set of characteristics defines the class. The cumula-
tive effect of the relationships is what matters. 28 Because the
definition of a basic concept is found in the web of similarities
and relationships of the basic characteristics which are included in
a class, no precise boundaries exist defining the class. Only an
explanation of the class is possible.'29
A more concrete explanation will elucidate the point. A group
seeking to litigate as a class is a collection of individuals. Since
the individuals are separate and discrete entities, all the particular
characteristics or orientation of any one person are not necessarily
present in any other person in the group. A careful inspection of
the characteristics of each person would reveal differences in each
person's orientation. For example, not all members will actually
occupy a particular point in time with respect to a right in relation
to a common subject matter. Some individuals will acquire their
claims at different moments. Also, all individuals of the group will
not have the exact desires or wants in relation to the subject matter
of the claim. Under family resemblance theory, individuals form a
class through the manifestation of a network or web of similarities
associated with a class.' 3° It is the relationship among the charac-
128. Under the theory of family relationships, it is incorrect to conclude that the web,
itself, is the defining element of the class. For example, focusing on the nature of the
web of relationships as distinguishing a group from a class misperceives the theory of
family resemblances. Focusing on the web of relationships is the same as using a right in
relation to a common subject, since it can always be broken down into the individual
characteristics which comprise it. Instead, the degree to which the characteristics overlap
and combine gives rise to the definition; that is, the dynamic relationships among the
characteristics defines a class. Id. at 36.
129. See id.
130. The more similarities and relationships among the individuals, the greater the rec-
ognition of a class. Since no firm boundary is possible, the fewer the relationships exhib-
ited, the less likely a class will be found. However, no defining point is possible as is
assumed under common right theory.
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teristics which provides the definition. If two people are described
as having a right in relation to a subject matter, they possess a
similar web of relationships among a bundle of the characteristics.
However, possession of the very same characteristics is merely
fortuitous and highly unlikely given the distinct qualities of the
individuals.
The theory of family resemblances is useful to break a label or
definition into its component parts. However, there is no precise
list of basic characteristics which constitute a right in relation to a
common subject matter or questions in relation to a common sub-
ject matter. Instead, Wittgenstein's theory points to the web of
relationships among a bundle of basic characteristics which permits
recognition of a person as either possessing or not the right in
relation to a common subject matter or questions in relation to a
common subject matter.
The common right theory assumes that the privity relationship
describes each individual as a class member because to be in privi-
ty is to have a discrete set of characteristics establishing a particu-
lar relationship between the parties. From family resemblance theo-
ry, privity actually serves as a label for a web of varying degrees
of similarities among the class members. However, privity is not
capable of isolating all the characteristics of each person which are
common to the class. Instead, privity among the members of a
class is a shorthand term for a great number of overlapping rela-
tionships.
Similar to common right theory, the community of interest
theory attempts to define a class by discretely defining the orienta-
tion of each individual in. relation to a subject matter. Under com-
munity of interest, the orientation is determined by the common
questions which arise from the subject matter. Thus, the theoretical
differences in how each theory defines a class exist only in what
characteristics are thought to define the class. The distinctions
between these theories fade under a family resemblance theory.
D. Similarities in the Two Theories
Understanding both the common right theory and the communi-
ty of interest theory from a family resemblance perspective, the
relevance of the differences in how a person's orientation is used
have only a quantitative meaning. Each theory purports to work by
defining a set of characteristics which will create a class. However,
the family resemblance theory demonstrates that it is not the dis-
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crete characteristics which define the class. Instead, it is the rela-
tionships among numerous overlapping characteristics. More pre-
cisely, individuals are related to one another in degrees depending
on the number of overlapping qualities they exhibit.
Both the right in relation to a common subject matter and the
question in relation to a common subject matter only describe or
label the basic characteristics. The manner in which these basic
qualities are related to one another actually determines whether the
individuals are sufficiently similar to be recognized as a class.
However, the network of relationships extends to all characteristics
exhibited by the individuals. All members of a class possess, to a
greater or lesser degree, similar overlapping qualities. Such is the
case whether the common right or the community of interest theory
is employed to determine whether to grant or deny a motion for
class certification. Thus, by explaining a class through reference to
the network of basic characteristics, the common right and commu-
nity of interest theories collapse into one,. and are, in essence,
opposite sides of the same coin.
Employing the family resemblance perspective, the separate
characteristics required by the two theories are not relevant to
defining the class. As noted above, the network of overlapping
relationships justifies recognition of the class. However, there is no
precise boundary determining at what point enough relationships
exist to term the group of individuals a class. Consequently, the
more relationships found in common the more likely a class exists;
conversely, the fewer common relationships, the less likely a class
will be recognized. Thus, the common right and community of
interest justifications only have a quantitative meaning, and as a
result classes certified under the theories are not qualitatively dif-
ferent. The two primary theories only differ in the degree to which
the basic characteristics match and differ despite their overt focus
on a right in relation to a common subject matter for the common
right theory and the questions in relation to a common subject
matter in the community of interest theory.
This similarity in the theories understood from the family re-
semblance perspective is useful for understanding class certification.
Applying the theory of family resemblances shows that the dispari-
ties in judicial decisions regarding class certification are unneces-
sary and, to a large degree, meaningless. The commonality located
by the common right and the community of interest theories stems
from the same origin - the greater or lesser degree of relation-
ships among the network of relationships. Thus, all the effort con-
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sumed by the courts in applying either theory and evaluating
whether the group of individuals satisfies the theory is not relevant
or useful. It is an artificial construct created by the courts based on
a false premise - that a precise set of characteristics can define
when individuals are sufficiently related to litigate as a class.
E. Considerations for Certification
The importance of the family resemblance lies in the accuracy
with which it describes reality. It recognizes the limitations inherent
in the defining process and, ultimately, the interconnectedness of
the common right and community of interest theories. Although
this perspective appears to make the certification process appear
unstructured, the theory of family resemblances actually provides a
uniform theoretical framework with which to conduct more accu-
rately the certification evaluation.
The basis of the class certification must be an awareness of
how a class is actually recognized, as elucidated by the family
resemblance theory. The focus must be on the dynamic quality
among the various attributes of the individuals, which is what
permits recognition of the person as a member of the class or
distinguishes him from the group. Implicit in such a focus is the
recognition that individuals will not be exactly alike in 'all relevant
manners. In particular, differences will exist among class members
in their orientation. Nonetheless, paying attention to the web of
relationships will ground Rule 23 in a unitary theoretical frame-
work and avoid the numerous contradictory decisions with regard
to class certification. 31
Of course in practical terms, applying the theory of family
resemblances is much more difficult. The difficulty, however, is
outweighed by the accuracy which it introduces in the certification
process and the resulting elimination of conflicting decisions. A
court considering a motion for certification must examine the de-
gree to which the individuals' characteristics overlap, relating them
in a cohesive manner. The court should not focus on the discrete
traits of the individuals but the manner in which the attributes
relate to one another. Using such a method in the certification
procedure will lead courts to make conclusions regarding the cohe-
siveness of the group, and not merely concentrate on whether all
individuals have the same characteristics.
131. See supra note 3.
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For example, assume that a number of women who claim
injury from use of the Dalkon Shield file a motion for certification.
Instead of simply looking for a common right or common ques-
tions, the court should look at the group of women as a whole and
examine the similarities and relationships shared by the putative
class that allow these individuals to call themselves a group. In
considering the motion, the court should examine such characteris-
tics as when the claims were acquired, how they arose, whether
they arise in the same manner, whether they involve the same
product, etc.
The court should explore these basic traits and the individuals'
relationship to them. The evaluation needs to concentrate on the
degree of similarity among all the traits and those women possess-
ing them. Some women's claims will arise at the same time and
some will have been acquired in the same manner. Other women's
claims will arise later or earlier, but in the same manner, and still
other women's claims will arise at the same time and in the same
manner, but as as the result of a different product. These factors as
a whole, or as a network of relationships, must guide the decision
to certify the class or not. Thus, certain women will be sufficiently
similarly situated to justify class treatment while others will be
distinguishable from the group and therefore not included in the
class.
The outcome, grant or denial of certification, is not the issue.
The importance of this analysis lies in the single theoretical per-
spective guiding the application of Rule 23. By using the theory of
family resemblances, courts will always be following a single ratio-
nale for certification instead of some courts using one justification
while others use another. As a result, Rule 23 will have a single
framework for application and the present disparities will disappear,
or at least, shrink in significance.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
At present, the case law surrounding class certification, particu-
larly in the area of mass tort class actions, is comprised of many
of conflicting decisions. Examination of the judicial opinions indi-
cates the confusion is not random, but actually related to the theo-
ry upon which the court defines a class. The two theories for un-
derstanding class definition, common right and community of in-
terest, came into use as a result of the very practical terms in
which amended Rule 23 was drafted.
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The amendments to Rule 23 eliminated the theoretic grounding
found in the original rule. Although the changes remedied other
difficulties with the original rule, new difficulties, on the class
definition level were created. The practical terms of the amended
rule allow the courts to approach the class certification process
from their own perspectives, giving the courts' perspectives deter-
minative effect on the certification process.
The family resemblance theory, as an alternative, is a better
method of understanding when a group is a class. It more fully
describes how a class is recognized and reveals the logical circular-
ity present in the certification process currently used.
Adopting the proposed theory as the. basis for recognizing
classes will provide a more uniform approach to class certification.
By requiring courts to examine fully the network of relationships
which permit recognition of a group, courts avoid the likelihood of
Rule 23 being applied in two distinct manners. Although the family
resemblance theory may require increased judicial discretion in
determining at what point there is sufficient similarity to certify a
class, the gains stemming from the increased coherence in applica-
tion of Rule 23 offset the discretion allowed individual judges. The
uniform structure for evaluation of class certification proposed here
permits courts to focus on other troubling aspects of class actions
and avoid disparate theoretical approaches.
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